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An Integrated Computational Model of
Multiparty Electoral Competition
Kevin M. Quinn and Andrew D. Martin
Abstract. Most theoretic models of multiparty electoral competition make
the assumption that party leaders are motivated to maximize their vote share
or seat share. In plurality-rule systems this is a sensible assumption. However,
in proportional representation systems, this assumption is questionable since
the ability to make public policy is not strictly increasing in vote shares
or seat shares. We present a theoretic model in which party leaders choose
electoral declarations with an eye toward the expected policy outcome of the
coalition bargaining game induced by the party declarations and the parties’
beliefs about citizens’ voting behavior. To test this model, we turn to data
from the 1989 Dutch parliamentary election. We use Markov chain Monte
Carlo methods to estimate the parties’ beliefs about mass voting behavior
and to average over measurement uncertainty and missing data. Due to the
complexity of the parties’ objective functions and the uncertainty in objective
function estimates, equilibria are found numerically. Unlike previous models
of multiparty electoral competition, the equilibrium results are consistent
with the empirical declarations of the four major Dutch parties.
Key words and phrases: Monte Carlo method, voting behavior, electoral
strategy, coalition formation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Democratic politics is fundamentally about allocat-
ing resources among competing interests. Those who
win enjoy the perquisites of office and the public policy
benefits that governing entails. Those who lose must
prepare to compete in the next election. In the United
States and other essentially two-party systems, under-
standing who wins and who loses is simple; one party
gets a majority of the vote and wins, while the other
party fails to do so and loses. In such systems, both par-
ties are interested in maximizing the number of votes
they receive since receiving the most votes implies
more or less complete control over both government
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perquisites and policy. In parliamentary democracies
with more than two parties—the most common form
of democratic government across the globe—winning
and losing is not so clear-cut. In these systems, rarely
do parties garner a majority of votes. Typically, two or
more parties must join together in a governing coali-
tion. Since the ultimate mix of perquisites and policy
is a result of bargaining between coalition partners, no
party is likely to get its most preferred outcome. Thus,
winning and losing is defined in terms of doing as well
as possible conditional on the strategies of the other
parties. Parties must be concerned with getting votes,
but they also must consider their prospects of sharing
resources with other parties in a governing coalition
(Laver and Shepsle, 1996).
To understand legislative politics and public policy
outputs in multiparty systems, it is thus necessary to
jointly understand voting behavior, electoral strategy
and coalition formation. Much has been written about
each stage of the process separately, but little has been
done to empirically join these literatures in a principled
fashion. This is likely due to the complex interdepen-
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dencies of these stages, as well as the problem of ac-
counting for uncertainty at all levels of the empirical
model. In this article we develop a simulation-based
methodology that allows us to deal with this complex-
ity.
In this text we offer a method that allows us to test
the predictions of one particular model of coalition
formation in multiparty democracies. The advantage
of this approach over an analytic one is that by
incorporating stochastic behavior into the theory, we
tie empirical analysis directly to the theoretical model.
Further, we gauge the predictions of models that
would be otherwise intractable. The disadvantage of
the approach is that the generality of the theoretical
model is sacrificed, although the method can be used
to consider other explanations of coalition formation.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we review current understanding of electoral compe-
tition in multiparty democracies. We discuss the 1989
Dutch parliamentary election—the application in this
article—in Section 3. Section 4 contains our model and
focuses on vote maximization and the policy motiva-
tions of political parties. This section discusses how to
integrate our estimates of key model parameters into
the modeling framework and how to solve for equilib-
ria numerically. In Section 5, we report the findings
from the operationalization of the model within the
context of the Netherlands in 1989. Here we account
for uncertainty in model inputs, present estimates of
voter utility functions and apply the results from the
statistical model to estimate equilibrium party strate-
gies. The final section concludes with a discussion
of the methodological and substantive implications of
this research, and some speculative thoughts as to how
these results relate to the more traditional, qualitative
literature on parties and party systems.
2. UNDERSTANDING MULTIPARTY
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
Understanding why political parties put forth a given
set of electoral platforms to an electorate is of pro-
found theoretical importance. (We use the terms elec-
toral platforms and electoral declarations interchange-
ably throughout the article.) Knowledge of this process
informs our understanding of such key issues as rep-
resentation, realignment and the stability of electoral
systems. Indeed, in pure multiparty parliamentary sys-
tems, understanding coalition formation means under-
standing legislative outputs and public policy forma-
tion.
Over the past 40 years a great deal has been
learned about what equilibrium electoral declarations
look like in plurality-rule systems of various sorts
(Downs, 1957; Davis and Hinich, 1966; Enelow and
Hinich, 1984, 1990; Coughlin, 1992). This literature
traces its intellectual roots to the spatial voting model
(Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957; Black, 1958). The
spatial voting model is predicated on the assumption
that the policy content of political issues can be
represented in a (typically) low-dimensional Euclidean
space. This space is typically called a policy space or
an issue space. For illustration, consider the simplest
one-dimensional case, with a parliament choosing the
income tax rate. Currently the tax rate is zero. The
choice of tax rate can be thought of as picking a
location on [0,1] or, after suitable transformation,
picking a location on the real number line. It is
important to note that the policy space need not be
defined in terms of monetary consequences; other
issues such as social policy can be thought of in the
same fashion, with points on the line representing the
liberalness of the policy. Higher dimensions arise with
multiple issues, which are typically correlated, thus
yielding a low-dimensional space. The key assumption
is that the policies relevant to decision making map into
this space.
To understand individual decision making, the two
relevant factors are the policy positions and the ideal
points of the actors. In the previous illustration, the lo-
cation of the status quo is zero and each proposal can be
represented by a point on the line. The spatial model as-
serts that each actor has an ideal point, or preferred pol-
icy position, in the space. This ideal point corresponds
to the policy that the individual would enact if they
had dictatorial power. With the policy locations and the
ideal points, the final assumption one has to make to
understand behavior is the utility function of the ac-
tors. The assumption of symmetric, quadratic utilities
(Enelow and Hinich, 1984) is typical, although others
use different functional forms (Coughlin, 1992). These
functions take the policy locations and ideal points as
arguments, and produce a personal utility to the deci-
sion maker. The model predicts that individuals will
vote for the options from which they derive greatest
utility.
The spatial model has been applied in essentially two
ways. Some have used the model to understand voting
by the mass public (Downs, 1957). Here candidates
standing for election can be thought of as the policy
locations in the space, and the voters can be thought of
as the decision makers. By assuming a specific random
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utility function, one can use models of multinomial
choice to statistically model voting behavior (e.g.,
Quinn, Martin and Whitford, 1999). The spatial model
has also been applied to the study of committee
decision making (Shepsle, 1979). In this case, the
legislators are the decision makers, who are voting over
proposals in the policy space.
One question of great importance when studying
multiparty systems is, “What electoral declarations do
parties make?” In other words, what location in this
Euclidean space will parties present to voters in a given
election? What makes this question interesting is the
fact that these choices are interdependent. That is, it is
not just the location of a single party that determines
voter choice, but rather it is the locations of every
party that determine how voters choose. Moreover,
the choices the parties make depend crucially on their
goals. To understand such an interdependent choice
setting, we make use of the game theoretic concept
of pure strategy Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). This
equilibrium concept suggests that each party will
choose a position such that it is a best response to
the best responses of all opposing parties. Such an
equilibrium has the property that it is defection-proof;
no party can unilaterally improve their standing by
adopting an alternative strategy.
With some exceptions (Wittman, 1983; Shepsle and
Cohen, 1990), the main findings from the spatial voting
literature are that parties in plurality-rule systems will
generally tend to take fairly centrist positions in equi-
librium. These “Downsian” convergence results hold
even for multiparty systems with high-dimensional is-
sue spaces as long as candidates are motivated by
winning and are sufficiently unsure of voter behav-
ior (Enelow and Hinich, 1989; Coughlin, 1992). While
scholars have gained a good understanding of electoral
competition in two-party systems (and plurality-rule
systems more generally), the same cannot be said for
multiparty proportional rule (PR) systems. This is par-
ticularly interesting since a very large proportion of the
world’s democracies feature some form of PR.
The reasons for the discrepancy between our knowl-
edge of electoral strategy in plurality-rule systems and
PR systems are manifold. Nonetheless, one of the key
reasons has to do with the linkage between electoral
declarations and policy outcomes in the two systems.
In multiparty PR systems, policy is ultimately decided
by a coalition government composed of a number of
the parties who have gained seats in parliament. As
Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) showed, the power
to determine policy is not monotonically increasing
in vote shares or seat shares in certain types of PR
systems. This implies that a theoretic model of elec-
toral competition in a multiparty PR system requires a
model of cabinet formation that is linked to the elec-
toral declarations put forth by the parties. Because of
the complexity of this linkage, few scholars have un-
dertaken such an empirical or theoretical modeling en-
terprise.
Rather than formulating such a model of multiparty
electoral competition, many researchers implicitly or
explicitly assume that parties in PR systems choose
electoral declarations to maximize vote share or seat
share. This has led several researchers to remark upon
the apparent discrepancy between the predictions de-
rived from theories of party strategy based on vote
maximization and estimates of the actual electoral dec-
larations put forth by parties (Dalton, 1985; Listhaug,
Macdonald and Rabinowitz, 1990; Rabinowitz, Mac-
donald and Listhaug, 1991; Iversen, 1994). Others con-
tend that policy outputs enter the decision calculus of
the parties and thus explain the divergence in electoral
declarations (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Our purpose in
this article is to compare the Nash equilibrium predic-
tions of vote-maximizing and policy-motivated parties.
We put forth a general modeling strategy that can be
used to evaluate equilibrium electoral strategies under
a variety of party motivations. Since the relationship
between electoral declarations and policy outcomes is
extremely difficult to deal with analytically in anything
other than the simplest of cases, we calculate equilibria
numerically. Our approach allows us to incorporate
uncertainty at all stages—-measurement, estimation
and postestimation equilibrium computation—into our
analysis. One of the dangers of such a computational
approach is the possibility that results may depend
critically on the values of key parameters that have
been set by the researcher. We attempt to minimize
this problem by estimating model parameters from a
representative national survey of the Dutch electorate.
While such an approach decreases the generality of
our results, it does increase the validity of our results
for the system under study. Our empirical focus is
on the Netherlands—a nation with an essentially pure
PR system—in the 1989 election. To foreshadow, the
results suggest that the electoral declarations actually
chosen by the four major Dutch parties in 1989 are
much more consistent with policy-seeking behavior
than with vote-maximizing behavior.
3. THE 1989 DUTCH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION
Operationalizing our computational model requires
us to obtain estimates of voter ideal points, voter
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perceptions of party platforms at the time of the survey
and voter utility functions. To do this we examine
data from the Netherlands in 1989. The Netherlands
features a very pure form of PR in which there is a
single national district and an extremely low electoral
threshold (0.67%). (In other words, all parties receiving
two thirds of 1% of the national vote will gain at
least one seat in Parliament.) Such features suggest
that the incentives for voters to engage in sophisticated
voting (contrary to our assumptions) are relatively
weak compared to other PR systems. Further, the
fact that the Netherlands has a single national district
means that district-specific attributes of candidates
are constant across the whole nation. This implies
that a nationally representative sample survey has
the potential to provide the information about voting
behavior that we desire.
While a number of Dutch parties have achieved rep-
resentation in the lower house of parliament in past
years, we focus on the four major parties: the PvdA,
the CDA, the VVD and the D66. The PvdA (Par-
tij van de Arbeid) is a traditional social democratic
party with left-wing economic stands and moderate
to liberal social positions. The CDA (Christen De-
mocratisch Appèl) is a Christian democratic party that
was formed from the three major religious parties in
1980. The CDA tends to take relatively conservative
positions on social issues (particularly abortion and eu-
thanasia) and moderate to slightly rightist positions on
economic issues. The VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid
en Democratie) is a traditional European liberal party
that takes conservative economic positions and mod-
erate positions on social policy. Finally, the D66 (De-
mocraten 66) is a relative newcomer to the party sys-
tem that has fought for reform of the electoral system
and a liberal social agenda. It tends to take moder-
ate positions on economic issues. We do not explic-
itly model the remaining Dutch parties. Instead, we as-
sume that they each receive a constant percentage of
the vote and vote against all possible cabinets in the
cabinet formation stage of the model. (This is not an
entirely unreasonable assumption given Dutch politi-
cal history prior to 1989, and especially given the atti-
tudes of the major party leaders toward the fifth largest
party—Groen Links.)
Our data come from the 1989 Dutch Parliamen-
tary Election Study (Anker and Oppenhuis, 1993).
This is the eighth national election study to be con-
ducted in the Netherlands, and was designed to study
the September 6, 1989 election for the Second Cham-
ber of the Dutch Parliament. This data set contains
N = 1784 individuals who reported voting for one of
the four major Dutch parties. It also included a battery
of demographic variables, as well as a battery of five
issue questions (on abortion, euthanasia, income equal-
ization, nuclear power and nuclear weapons), where
the voters were asked to report their own preferences
as well as their perceptions of the positions of the four
major parties.
4. A MODEL OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL
COMPETITION
We can think about the process by which electoral
declarations lead to policy outputs as being similar to
the process in Figure 1. At the outset of election, parties
make electoral policy declarations. These declarations,
typically formalized in party manifestos, locate the
parties in the policy space. Given those declarations,
voters cast ballots for the parties. The expectation is
that voters choose parties close to them in the policy
space. After the election, vote totals are translated
into seat shares by an exogenous rule. After seats are
allocated, the parties enter a bargaining game, where
they ultimately vote over cabinets, portfolio allocations
and other perquisites. This game results in a cabinet,
typically consisting of more than one party, that forms
public policy. Note that a fair amount of knowledge
exists regarding each of the five steps individually. An
equilibrium in this game consists of a set of party
policy platforms and strategies for forming coalition
governments such that no party has an incentive to
unilaterally change its policy platform or its rule for
forming a coalition government. In what follows we
assume equilibrium behavior in the later stages of
the game and focus on finding equilibrium policy
declarations. The sequential structure of this process
FIG. 1. Schematic model of parliamentary electoral competition.
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also suggests that equilibrium electoral declarations
can be found in the first node by working backward
through the process (Selten, 1965).
In the remainder of this section we sequentially
operationalize the process sketched above. We then go
on to show how equilibrium electoral declarations can
be calculated under the assumption of policy-motivated
parties and under the assumption of vote-maximizing
parties.
4.1 Calculating Empirical Electoral Declarations
and Citizen Policy Preferences
The key to the spatial voting model is locating voters
and parties in the same issue space. To measure voter
ideal points we employ a factor analytic measurement
model of the responses to the five issue questions in the
survey. (See Quinn, Martin and Whitford, 1999, for a
justification of this procedure.) An example of one of
the issue questions in the Dutch Parliamentary Election
Study (Anker and Oppenhuis, 1993) is the following:
Abortion: Some people think that the gov-
ernment should forbid abortion in all cir-
cumstances; other people think that every
woman should have the right to decide
whether she wants an abortion. Of course,
there are also people with an intermediate
opinion. Suppose we place the people who
think that abortion should be forbidden un-
der all circumstances at the beginning of
this line (at number 1) and the people who
think that every woman has the right to de-
cide for herself at the end of this line (at
number 7). First I shall ask you to indicate
the position of a number of political parties
on this line. If you do not know what posi-
tion a party has on this issue, please do not
hesitate to tell me.
• Where would you place the CDA on this
line?
• And the PvdA?
• And the VVD?
• And D66?
• And where would you place yourself on
this line?
In addition to this question on abortion, citizens were
asked similarly constructed questions on nuclear power,
state attempts to reduce income inequality, euthanasia
and the deployment of nuclear weapons.
As in all survey research, item nonresponse is a seri-
ous problem. Here we deal with missing data through
multiple imputation. We use a multivariate Normal
model to characterize the joint distribution of the raw
survey data. In addition to the demographic covariates
listed in Table 1 and the responses to the issue ques-
tions, measures of political knowledge were included
in the imputation model to help predict missing re-
sponses. We employed the software of King, Honaker,
Joseph and Scheve (2001), whose approach is based
on the work of Little and Rubin (1987) and Schafer
(1997). The primary difference is that the algorithm
generates imputations via importance sampling from
the posterior distribution rather than using data aug-
mentation or the expectation-maximization algorithm.
We treat the vote choice response as a nominal vari-
able. We created and stored five imputed data sets.
Let i = 1, . . . ,N index citizens and j = 1, . . . , J
index parties. Let wi represent the vector of citi-
zen i’s responses to the five issue questions and let
w
(j)
i represent the vector of citizen i’s perceptions of
party j on the five issues. Our goal is to use the data
on these issue questions to estimate citizen i’s ideal
point θi in the two-dimensional issue space X. We
assume that the underlying Dutch issue space is two-
dimensional, with one dimension reflecting underlying
TABLE 1
Social-structural covariates used to estimate Dutch voter utility functions, 1989
Variable Description
Religiosity Religiosity dummy (0 = not religious, 1 = religious)
Catholic Catholic dummy (0 = not Catholic, 1 = Catholic)
Social class Social class scale (0 = lowest social class to 4 = highest social class)
Union member Union dummy (0 = not union member, 1 = union member)
Income Income scale (0 = lowest to 6 = highest)
Education Education scale (0 = lowest to 4 = highest)
Age Age categories (0 = lowest to 12 = highest)
Rural Rural dummy (0 = not rural residence, 1 = rural residence)
Urban Urban dummy (0 = not urban residence, 1 = urban residence)
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economic preferences and the other reflecting prefer-
ences on social policy. This is consistent with much
of the literature on Dutch voting behavior (see Quinn,
Martin and Whitford, 1999, for a review). We would
also like to make inferences about citizen i’s percep-
tion of party j ’s electoral platform (denoted ψ(j)i ) in
the two-dimensional issue space as well as the mean
perception across the population of party j ’s electoral
platform (denoted ψ˜(j)) in the two-dimensional issue
space.
The measurement model used to estimate voter ideal
points is given by
wi =θi + εi,(1)
where εi ∼ N (0,) and  is a diagonal matrix
with the r th diagonal element given by σ 2rr . We
assume the following priors: r ∼N (¯r,r ), σ 2rr ∼
IG(ν/2, δ/2) and θi ∼ N (0,), where r denotes
the nonzero elements of the r th row of  and  =[ 1 ρ
ρ 1
]
. (Some of the elements of  are set to 0 for
reasons of identification.) LetN (a, b) denote a normal
distribution with mean a and variance b, and let
IG(a, b) denote an inverse gamma distribution with
shape a and scale b. We assume a uniform hyperprior
for ρ. It is assumed that  is R ×K and θi is K × 1,
where R is the number of manifest issue responses (in
this case, R = 5) and K is the number of latent issue
dimensions (in this case, K = 2). In this application,
we set ¯r to be a vector of zeros, r = 10,000I ,
ν = 2 and δ = 1.
This measurement model is fitted via Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC). We can sample from the
distribution of the average voter perception of the party
declarations for all parties—denoted (ψ˜)—by viewing
it as a deterministic function of the model parameters.
Appendix A describes the algorithm employed and
how the distribution of (ψ˜) is calculated within the
MCMC algorithm. It is important to note that our
MCMC sampling produces a series of draws that are
approximately from p(θ, ψ˜|Dmis,Dobs). We fit the
model to each of the five imputed data sets.
To illustrate the findings from our measurement
model, Figure 2 displays the mean perceptions of the
party electoral declarations and the underlying density
of voter ideal points based on a single draw from
the posterior distribution of these parameters. This
comports well with our qualitative understanding of
the Dutch party system. Table 2 presents the results
from our measurement model averaged across the five
imputed data sets.
FIG. 2. Empirical party positions of Dutch parties overlaid on
a highest density plot of voter ideal points, 1989. Running from
lightest to darkest, the highest density contours represent the
smallest regions of the policy space that contain 95, 75, 50, and
1% of the underlying density of voter ideal points.
4.2 Calculating Seat Strengths Given Electoral
Declarations and Citizen Policy Preferences
The next step of the process is to use the measures
of voter and party location obtained above to estimate
voter utility functions. With this information we can
then make inferences about the likely vote share and
seat shares of parties for a particular configuration of
party electoral declarations. We assume that voters vote
expressively in the election according to a probabilistic
rule. That is, they tend to vote myopically for the
party that puts forth the electoral declaration they
most prefer regardless of the policy consequences. To
operationalize this, we employ a multinomial logit
(MNL) model.
The MNL model can be motivated by a random
utility assumption. Let zij denote the utility to voter i
of voting for party j . Assume
zij = x′ij β + εij ,(2)
where εij follows a log-Weibull distribution (McFad-
den, 1974) and
yij =
{
1, if zij = max(zi),
0, otherwise.
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TABLE 2
Summary of the posterior density of a factor model of the Dutch issue space, 1989 (results are
averaged over the five imputed data sets)
Posterior Posterior Posterior 95% BCI
Parameter mean median std. dev. Lower Upper
Economic factor
λabortion 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
λnuclear plants −0.595 −0.595 0.034 −0.662 −0.528
λequalize income −0.551 −0.551 0.033 −0.616 −0.484
λeuthanasia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
λnuclear weapons −0.519 −0.518 0.036 −0.588 −0.450
Social factor
λabortion −0.730 −0.730 0.036 −0.800 −0.661
λnuclear plants 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
λequalize income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
λeuthanasia −0.798 −0.798 0.038 −0.871 −0.722
λnuclear weapons −0.134 −0.134 0.030 −0.191 −0.074
ρeconomic, religious 0.221 0.220 0.029 0.163 0.279
N 1754
Total Gibbs iterations per data set 5000
Number of factor models 5
Then the MNL sampling density is given by
f (y|β)=
N∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
Pr(yij = 1|β)yij ,
where
Pr(yij = 1|β)=
exp(x′ij β)∑p
k=1 exp(x′ikβ)
.(3)
In what follows we employ improper, uniform priors
for the elements of β .
Historically, sociological factors played the domi-
nant role in explaining voter choice in the Netherlands.
As denominational and class lines began to soften in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, issue voting became
increasingly important. Recent work (Alvarez and Na-
gler, 1998; Quinn, Martin and Whitford, 1999) sug-
gests that sociological factors and issue preferences
play an important, joint role in determining voter be-
havior. For these reasons we choose to include both so-
ciological variables and issue variables in our empirical
model of voting behavior. The specific covariates used
in the analysis are presented in Table 1.
To capture the voter issue preferences we include
the squared distance between each voter i’s ideal
policy θi and the mean perceived party location of
each party ψ˜(j) as a choice-specific covariate for j =
1, . . . , J . Since the MNL covariates X depend on
draws from p(θ, ψ˜ |Dmis,Dobs), we take five draws
from p(θ, ψ˜ |Dmis,Dobs) for each of the five imputed
data sets and then fit a MNL model to each of these 25
data sets. We use the Metropolis algorithm to sample
from the posterior density of this model. Note that
this allows us to obtain a sample approximately from
p(β|Dmis,Dobs, θ, ψ˜). Table 3 summarizes the results
from the 25 MNL models.
To illustrate the substantive implications of changes
in party electoral declarations, we graph the expected
vote share of a given party against potential policy
locations of the party in the two-dimensional policy
space, conditional on the other three parties remain-
ing fixed at their estimated actual locations in the
policy space. The vote shares are computed using the
coefficient estimates from the vote choice model. Fig-
ures 3–6 display the impact changes in party electoral
declarations on voting behavior. From these figures we
can see that the vote shares of the two largest parties—
CDA and PvdA—are quite sensitive to changes in
electoral declarations, yet each of these two parties
can count on maintaining about 6–10% of the vote
regardless of the electoral position taken within the
[−2,2] square. On the other hand, the vote shares of
the smaller parties—VVD and D66—are less sensitive
to the parties’ policy positions. It is also interesting to
note that no party could gain a simple majority of the
vote given the empirical locations of the other parties.
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TABLE 3
Results from the 25 MNL models
Posterior Posterior Posterior 95% BCI
Parameter mean median std. dev. Lower Upper
Spatial distance −0.295 −0.294 0.029 −0.354 −0.241
Religiosity PvdA 0.101 0.101 0.220 −0.324 0.530
VVD 0.406 0.402 0.271 −0.106 0.956
CDA 1.430 1.434 0.268 0.903 1.958
Catholic PvdA 0.401 0.401 0.185 0.033 0.764
VVD 0.280 0.298 0.236 −0.277 0.704
CDA 0.979 0.983 0.195 0.581 1.353
Class PvdA −0.639 −0.635 0.114 −0.866 −0.425
VVD −0.038 −0.033 0.116 −0.282 0.176
CDA −0.316 −0.311 0.104 −0.533 −0.125
Union member PvdA 1.008 0.996 0.196 0.664 1.433
VVD −0.090 −0.115 0.311 −0.650 0.562
CDA 0.176 0.159 0.250 −0.258 0.710
Income PvdA −0.094 −0.093 0.060 −0.215 0.022
VVD 0.174 0.177 0.069 0.031 0.302
CDA 0.054 0.055 0.059 −0.064 0.163
Education PvdA −0.313 −0.316 0.106 −0.520 −0.103
VVD −0.189 −0.191 0.105 −0.387 0.038
CDA −0.155 −0.160 0.111 −0.367 0.084
Age PvdA 0.107 0.107 0.038 0.034 0.181
VVD 0.102 0.099 0.048 0.015 0.201
CDA 0.151 0.151 0.042 0.072 0.234
Rural PvdA −0.162 −0.178 0.306 −0.724 0.488
VVD 0.112 0.113 0.302 −0.491 0.686
CDA 0.027 0.020 0.309 −0.551 0.627
Urban PvdA −0.122 −0.116 0.220 −0.561 0.319
VVD −0.156 −0.161 0.260 −0.616 0.454
CDA −0.112 −0.107 0.261 −0.613 0.393
Constant PvdA 2.736 2.729 0.334 2.094 3.400
VVD −0.042 −0.036 0.427 −0.891 0.761
CDA 0.746 0.735 0.408 −0.035 1.579
FIG. 3. Expected CDA vote share at various electoral declara-
tions conditional on empirical locations of the other Dutch parties,
1989.
FIG. 4. Expected PvdA vote share at various electoral declara-
tions conditional on empirical locations of the other Dutch parties,
1989.
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FIG. 5. Expected VVD vote share at various electoral declara-
tions conditional on empirical locations of the other Dutch parties,
1989.
FIG. 6. Expected D66 vote share at various electoral declara-
tions conditional on empirical locations of the other Dutch parties,
1989.
With knowledge of the voters’ utility functions
[embodied in p(β|Dmis,Dobs, θ, ψ˜)] we can go on to
make inferences about the vote shares and seat shares
that would accrue to parties if they were to put forth a
different set of electoral declarations. Calculating vote
shares for parties is simple because it only requires
plugging new values of the covariates into equation (3)
and calculating the voting probabilities for the voters.
A deterministic rule maps votes into parliamentary
seats. We assume the d’Hondt rule (see Cox, 1997)
translates citizens’ votes in the parliamentary election
into seats, which is the actual institutional rule used in
the Netherlands.
4.3 Calculating Equilibrium Cabinets and Policy
Outcomes Given Electoral Declarations and
Seat Strengths
With knowledge of the policy positions and seat
shares of the parties, we can go on to examine the for-
mation of governments and public policy in the Par-
liament. To model cabinet formation and policy enact-
ments we use a version of Laver and Shepsle’s (1996)
model of cabinet formation. The Laver–Shepsle model
assumes the existence of a K-dimensional policy space
X ⊆ RK . Parties j = 1, . . . , J are assumed to have
fixed policy positions ψj ∈X. As noted above, in the
Dutch application, the set of parties is assumed to con-
sist of PvdA, CDA, VVD and D66. It is assumed that
parties are motivated by public policy and attempt to
produce public policy that is most consistent with their
policy positions. More concretely, we assume that the
utility party j attaches to a particular policy outcome is
given by the negative squared distance between ψj and
the policy outcome in question. In addition to a policy
position, each party is assumed to have a nonnegative
seat strength. This is simply the number of seats the
party in question controls in the parliament.
Given the set of parties and the parties’ policy po-
sitions, utility functions and seat strengths, the Laver–
Shepsle model works as follows. (See Chapters 3 and 4
of Laver and Shepsle, 1996, for a more detailed discus-
sion of their model.) Stage I of the model consists of a
party from the set of parties being chosen to propose a
cabinet. A cabinet consists of an allocation of the var-
ious ministry portfolios (i.e., the Finance Minister, the
Home Affairs Minister, etc.) to the parties. Following
the actual parliamentary rules used in the Dutch Par-
liament, we assume that the party with the largest seat
strength is allowed to make the first proposal. We make
the simplifying assumption that political competition is
primarily over two ministries — the Finance Ministry
and the Ministry of Home Affairs. (Laver and Shep-
sle, 1996, page 153, presented evidence from a survey
of country experts that suggests this assumption is rea-
sonable.) Each ministry corresponds with one of the
issue dimensions in the policy space. In Stage II of the
model, parties controlling ministries under the Stage I
proposal are allowed to veto the proposed cabinet by
refusing to accept the portfolios they were allocated. If
the cabinet is vetoed, we go to Stage I and a new party
is allowed to propose a cabinet. If no party vetoes a
proposed cabinet we move to Stage III of the model.
In Stage III, the Parliament as a whole votes for either
the proposed cabinet or for the status quo cabinet (the
last cabinet approved by a majority of the Parliament).
For our purposes, the game stops when a parliamentary
majority approves a cabinet.
Laver and Shepsle assumed that a cabinet produces
public policy dimension by dimension. In other words,
the party that controls a particular ministry sets policy
on the dimension that corresponds with that ministry.
For instance, in the Dutch case we assume the policy
space is two-dimensional. The first dimension corre-
sponds to economic policy controlled by the Finance
Ministry and the second dimension corresponds to so-
cial policy controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
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A cabinet may consist of CDA controlling the Finance
Ministry and PvdA controlling the Ministry of Home
Affairs. In this case, CDA would set economic policy
to its preferred mix of economic policies (given by the
first element of ψCDA) and PvdA would set social pol-
icy to its preferred mix of social policies (given by the
second element of ψPvdA).
An equilibrium cabinet in the Laver–Shepsle model
is an allocation of ministerial portfolios that is majority
preferred to all other possible allocations of ministerial
portfolios. It is important to remember that parties are
assumed to be motivated not by controlling portfolios
but by the policy outcomes that result from a particular
cabinet. Thus a party may well prefer not to be
a member of a governing coalition if staying in
opposition produces public policy that is more in line
with its policy preferences. Equilibrium cabinets can
be found by searching through the set of cabinets
that are majority preferred to the status quo cabinet
(the cabinet in place at the time of the election).
To summarize, once we know the parties’ policy
declarations and the associated seat strengths, we can
find equilibrium cabinets and policy outcomes using
the Laver and Shepsle (1996) model.
4.4 Finding Equilibrium Policy Declarations
Suppose that party j is looking down the game tree
and is choosing its electoral declaration ψj . Party j ’s
goal is to find the value of ψj that maximizes its utility
given its beliefs about the values of the other quantities
in the model (ψ−j ,Dmis,Dobs, θ, ψ˜, β). We say that
a collection of party electoral declarations ψ is an
equilibrium configuration of electoral declarations if
no party can unilaterally choose a different electoral
declaration and improve its payoff.
To search for equilibrium configurations of electoral
declarations we need to define the parties’ utility
functions and show how to calculate expected utility. In
what follows, we let uj (ψj |ψ−j ,Dmis,Dobs, θ, ψ˜, β)
denote the utility j receives from putting forth electoral
declaration ψj given particular values of ψ−j ,Dmis,
Dobs, θ, ψ˜ and β .
We look at two possibilities for uj (ψj |ψ−j ,Dmis,
Dobs, θ, ψ˜, β). First, that parties are motivated by
maximizing vote share. Under this assumption, the
utility that party j gets from electoral declaration ψj
is simply the fraction of the votes j would expect to
receive given this policy declaration and the values of
the other model parameters.
The second type of party motivation we explore
is that parties are motivated by public policy in a
fashion consistent with the Laver and Shepsle (1996)
model. As noted above, given values of all the model
parameters, it is possible to find the policy outcome
of the ultimate coalition bargaining game induced by
the electoral declarations, voter ideal points and the
voter utility functions. We assume that the payoff
party j gets from a particular policy outcome is the
negative squared distance between the spatial location
of the policy outcome and the party’s true ideal point
(which we take to be ψ˜(j)). While it is not possible to
easily write down this functional relationship between
policy declarations and utility, it is possible to evaluate
this utility function at particular values of the model
parameters. This will prove important when calculating
expected utility below.
Since Dmis, θ, ψ˜ and β are not known with certainty,
we need to average over these quantities to calculate
the expected utility of an electoral declaration. If we
knew the joint distribution of the quantities given the
observed data we could still calculate expected utility
according to
Uj(ψj |ψ−j ,Dobs)
=
∫∫∫∫
uj (ψj |ψ−j ,Dmis,Dobs, θ, ψ˜, β)
× p(Dmis, θ, ψ˜, β|Dobs) dDmis dθ dψ˜ dβ.
(4)
Rather than try to deal with the right hand side of Equa-
tion (4) directly, we use the rules of conditional proba-
bility and proceed to factor p(Dmis, θ, ψ˜, β|Dobs) into
smaller chunks and construct a Monte Carlo estimate
of Uj(ψj |ψ−j ,Dobs). This works as follows.
• For l = 1, . . . ,L:
– Draw D(l)mis from p(Dmis|Dobs).
– Draw (θ(l), ψ˜(l)) from p(θ, ψ˜ |Dobs,D(l)mis).
– Draw β(l) from p(β|Dobs,D(l)mis, θ(l), ψ˜(l)).• Calculate
Uˆj (ψj |ψ−j ,Dobs)
= 1
L
L∑
l=1
uj (ψj |ψ−j ,D(l)mis,Dobs, θ(l), ψ˜(l), β(l)).
(5)
Such an estimate can be made arbitrarily accurate by
increasing the number of random draws L. As noted
above, draws from p(Dmis|Dobs), p(θ, ψ˜ |Dobs,D(l)mis)
and p(β|Dobs,D(l)mis, θ(l), ψ˜(l)) are available from
MCMC sampling. As a practical matter, we saved
five draws of Dmis from p(Dmis|Dobs), five draws
of (θ, ψ˜) from p(θ, ψ˜ |Dobs,Dmis) for each of the
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five previous draws of D(l)mis and five draws from
p(β|Dobs,Dmis, θ, ψ˜) for each of the 25 previous
draws of (θ, ψ˜).
Because of the intractability of the parties’ expected
utility functions it is not feasible to characterize equi-
librium declarations analytically. Instead equilibria are
found via an iterative tâtonnement process. This works
as follows:
1. Randomly assign starting declarations.
2. Randomly permute parties.
(a) Party 1 maximizes expected utility conditional
on the other parties’ electoral declarations.
(b) Party 2 maximizes expected utility conditional
on the other parties’ electoral declarations.
(c) Similarly for remaining parties.
3. (a) If no movement in the last two permutations,
return current configuration of electoral decla-
rations. These are supported in equilibrium.
(b) Else go to step 2.
While such an algorithm is not guaranteed to find all
potential equilibrium declarations, the declarations that
it returns (if any) will in fact be part of a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. The advantage of focusing on dec-
larations that are arrived at through such an adaptive
process is that they are consistent with a very simple
model of human reasoning in which each player men-
tally works through such a process of adaptive opti-
mization until a steady state is reached. Rational play-
ers would then play the appropriate equilibrium strate-
gies (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Section 1.2.5, for
a more detailed discussion).
5. EQUILIBRIUM RESULTS
5.1 Vote Maximization
We begin by examining the case in which the
parties are motivated solely by vote maximization.
As noted above, the assumption of vote-maximizing
parties is fairly common in the substantive literature
on multiparty electoral competition as well as some of
the rational choice literature. As we show below, this
assumption is not supported by the 1989 Dutch data.
With vote-maximizing parties, uj (ψj |ψ−j ,Dmis,
Dobs, θ, ψ˜, β) is simply the vote share that party j can
expect from choosing ψj given ψ−j ,Dmis,Dobs, θ, ψ˜
and β . We numerically found constellations of elec-
toral declarations that are supported in Nash equilib-
rium given the vote-maximizing specification of party
utility. Figure 7 displays these equilibrium platforms.
FIG. 7. Equilibrium electoral declarations with vote-maximizing
parties, 1989.
As we expect, the vote-maximizing equilibrium
declarations are very centrist and located very near the
mean of the voter distribution. (For similar, theoretic
results, see, Lin, Enelow and Dorussen, 1999, and
Erikson and Romero, 1990.) The minor departures
from the mean voter position are due to the inclusion of
the sociological variables in the voter utility functions.
A cursory comparison of Figures 7 and 2 reveals
that the equilibrium declarations with vote-maximizing
parties are quite different from the empirical party
declarations. Based on our 1989 data, the four major
Dutch parties did not take electoral positions that
are consistent with vote-maximizing behavior and
equilibrium play.
5.2 Policy-Seeking Parties
Next we assume that parties put forth electoral decla-
rations to influence the policy outcome of the impend-
ing cabinet formation game. To calculate uj (ψj |ψ−j ,
Dmis,Dobs, θ, ψ˜, β) in this case, we calculate the vote
shares that are implied by ψ,Dmis,Dobs, θ, ψ˜ and β;
allocate seats according to the d’Hondt method; cal-
culate the equilibrium cabinet and associated policy
output based on the Laver and Shepsle (1996) model;
and then calculate the negative squared distance be-
tween this policy outcome and party j ’s ideal policy.
Averaging over all 125 draws of the model parameters
gives us an estimate of the expected utility of ψj to
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FIG. 8. Equilibrium electoral declarations with policy-seeking
parties, 1989.
party j given the other party declarations and the ob-
served data.
Once again we calculate Nash equilibria numerically
based upon this specification of utility. Figure 8 dis-
plays the equilibrium party declarations in which par-
ties are motivated by policy goals. This figure reveals
a configuration of party positions that is much more in
line with the empirical locations depicted in Figure 2.
To provide some intuition as to why we see such di-
vergence in electoral declarations with policy-seeking
parties we examine the CDA’s expected utility func-
tion conditional on the equilibrium declarations of the
other parties and the observed data. Figure 9 depicts
this function. First, note that this is not an easy func-
tion to maximize. Because of the low dimensionality
of the search space, we employed a very simple grid
search on the [−2,2] square. [Before implementing the
grid search, we experimented with various derivative-
free optimization algorithms, including the Nelder and
Mead (1965), simplex method. Due to the complex-
ity of the objective function, as illustrated in Figure 9,
these methods did not converge. In all of the Nash
finding grid searches, we multistarted them from var-
ious points in the space, and have achieved the same
equilibrium from each run. We have also used vari-
ous grid sizes for the grid search. Of course, this in no
way guarantees that the equilibrium is unique, but we
do know that it is an equilibrium.] More importantly,
FIG. 9. Expected utility to CDA of various electoral declarations,
1989.
Figure 9 provides important insight into why policy-
seeking parties will tend to diverge from the center
of the voter distribution. At its equilibrium declara-
tion, the CDA is able to control economic policy but
not social policy—there will always be a majority in
parliament who are willing to block cabinets in which
CDA can enact its rather extreme (relative to the other
parties) preferred social policies. The only way that
CDA can gain control over social policy is to move
south of the PvdA’s position. However, since we as-
sume that parties must try to enact policy consistent
with their electoral declarations, the CDA would actu-
ally be forced to enact social policy that is more liberal
than the social policy pursued by the PvdA in equi-
librium. This is why we see the dip in the CDA’s ex-
pected utility as it takes centrist positions. If the CDA
were to take extremely liberal social positions (corre-
sponding to negative values on the social dimension),
it once again is unable to implement social policy and
consequently its utility is roughly the same as when it
chooses extreme, conservative positions.
We also make a preliminary attempt to examine the
extent to which these equilibrium results are dependent
upon the salience of policy issues estimated from
the 1989 data. As noted previously, issue voting has
become increasingly prevalent in the Dutch electorate
in recent years. Would we expect to see a different
constellation of party declarations in equilibrium if
voters attached increasing amounts of weight to issue
concerns?
To examine this we computed a policy-maximizing
equilibrium in which the MNL coefficient on spatial
distance was set to be equal to the values drawn
from the MNL posterior minus 1.00. This implies
that voters are behaving in a much more deterministic
MULTIPARTY ELECTORAL COMPETITION 417
manner. The equilibrium results (not shown here)
are nearly identical to those from the empirically
calibrated policy-seeking model. This suggests that the
policy-seeking equilibria may be relatively robust to
modest changes in the model parameters.
As a conjecture, we speculate that this model may
help elucidate some of the microfoundations under-
lying the observations of scholars such as Lipset and
Rokkan (1967) regarding the relative stasis in most
party systems. It may well be the case that once an
electoral equilibrium is reached, it may take very large
changes in either voter preferences or the preferences
of party leaders to result in noticeable shifts in the
policy declarations of parties. Further, this model sug-
gests that the reason many European parties in PR sys-
tems have not completely muted their programmatic
appeals and become true “catchall” parties has less to
do with ideological consistency as suggested by schol-
ars such as Kirchheimer (1966) and more to do with the
nonmonotonic relationship between seats and political
power. Finally, it must be remembered that the real rea-
son we see electoral divergence in our model is because
parties are assumed to have diverse policy preferences.
To understand the reasons for this, it is useful to return
to the more traditional literature on party recruitment.
6. CONCLUSION
The results presented here strongly suggest that to
understand electoral competition in multiparty democ-
racies, it is not enough to know voter preferences and
the dimensionality of the issue space. Instead, expec-
tations of postelectoral coalition bargaining very likely
exert a substantial effect on the electoral declarations
of political parties.
This leaves us with the theoretical challenge of de-
veloping models of multiparty electoral politics that are
based on richer assumptions about party motivations.
In large part, this theoretical enterprise revolves around
the correct specification of the parties’ objective func-
tions. The specification of these objective functions
presupposes an understanding of (1) how electoral dec-
larations translate into seat strengths, (2) how electoral
declarations and seat strengths translate into govern-
ing coalitions, and (3) how electoral declarations, seat
strengths and coalition structures translate into policy
outcomes and government perquisites. The approach
that we have adopted is but one of many ways to spec-
ify parties’ objective functions.
The power of the computational approach presented
in this article is that it does not require the ability to
write down the parties’ objective functions in closed
form. Instead, all it requires is that one can evaluate
the objective functions at any point in the policy space.
While computational solutions lack the generality of
analytical results, it is our belief that in areas such as
multiparty electoral competition, where the phenom-
ena under study are both extremely complex and where
simple theoretical models seem at odds with empirical
reality, a combination of empirical analysis and com-
putational modeling offers great promise. By compar-
ing the computed results of specific models against em-
pirical observations, we can gain a better understand-
ing of the strengths and weaknesses of the underlying
theoretical models with the hope of continually refin-
ing and generalizing such models.
Further, just as numerical methods are often used
to solve applied general equilibrium models in eco-
nomics to better understand the policy impact of var-
ious types of government intervention, the modeling
strategy sketched here can be used to gain insight into
the normative consequences of demographic and insti-
tutional changes. For instance, it may be interesting to
examine the effect of the Dutch population becoming
increasingly secular. Would such a change result in dif-
ferent coalition governments or has the history of the
Dutch party system put the CDA in a position where
it can continue to be a major player in coalition poli-
tics despite the loss in votes that would come from the
increasing secularization of politics? Using our model-
ing strategy it is sensible to entertain a counterfactual
change in the composition of the voting public since
(with nonstrategic voters) this should not affect voting
behavior. Additionally, it would be possible to explore
the implications of including the addition of another
party into the political sphere (after making strong as-
sumptions about the effect of sociological characteris-
tics), changes in the distribution of voter preferences
and the case when voters choose purely on the issues.
It is worth emphasizing that when conducting such
counterfactual exercises one must be careful to enter-
tain counterfactuals that are consistent with assump-
tions under which the model parameters were esti-
mated. For instance, it is not possible for the model
sketched here to answer the question of what would
happen to equilibrium electoral declarations if an ex-
ternal shock such as a war or economic crisis gave po-
litical elites the opportunity to engage in heresthetic
maneuvers that changed the dimensionality and com-
ponents of the issue space. Such heresthetical changes
would yield an entirely different spatial representation,
which would be impossible to explore given our model.
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Additionally, it would be impossible to explore the pos-
sibility of policy-minded sophisticated voting. Simi-
larly, relaxing the independence of irrelevant alterna-
tive assumptions makes exploring the implications of
party change impossible.
Substantively, this modeling strategy has the poten-
tial to clarify the microfoundations underlying more
traditional qualitative analyses of European party sys-
tems. It is important to recognize that studying party
declarations, voting behavior and coalition formation
independently cannot provide answers to fundamental
questions about multiparty democracies. To do so, it is
vital to integrate these separate levels of analysis into a
single theoretical and empirical model. The methodol-
ogy we provide here allows us to do so.
APPENDIX: MCMC ALGORITHM FOR THE
MEASUREMENT MODEL
The algorithm used to fit the measurement model is
the following:
1. For i = 1, . . . ,N , draw θi from N (θˆi , Vθi ), where
Vθi = (+′−1)−1 and θˆi = Vθi (′−1wi).
2. For r = 1, . . . ,R, draw r from N (ˆr ,Vr ),
where Vr = (r + σ−2rr +′r+r )−1, ˆr =
Vr (
−1
r
¯r + σ−2rr +rwr) and +r denotes the
columns of + that correspond to r .
3. For r = 1, . . . ,R, draw σ 2rr from IG[(α + n)/2,
(β + er)/2], where er = (wr −+′r )′(wr −+′r).
4. Draw ρ via the Metropolis step:
• Let ρ(c) denote the current value of ρ.
• Draw ρ(p) from N (ρ(c), δ), where δ is a user
defined tuning parameter.
• Set ρ = ρ(p) with probability
min
{
1,
p(ρ(p)|w,,)
p(ρ(c)|w,,)
}
;
else set ρ = ρ(p), where p(ρ|w,,) =
f (w|,,ρ)p()p()p(ρ).
Iterating through this sequence of draws yields a series
of draws from the joint posterior of (,+,,ρ). With
the exception of the Metropolis step to sample the
factor correlation coefficient, this algorithm is very
similar to that in Lopes and West (1999).
We can sample from the joint distribution of the
voter ideal points (θ) and the average voter perception
of the party declarations at the time of the survey (ψ˜)
by viewing it as a deterministic function of the model
parameters. We can do so from p(θ, ψ˜ |Dobs,Dmis) by
inserting the following steps into the MCMC sampling
scheme:
• For i = 1, . . . ,N and j = 1, . . . , J , draw ψ(j)i from
N (ψˆ
(j)
i , Vψ(j)i
), where V
ψ
(j)
i
= ( + ′−1)−1
and ψˆ(j)i = Vψ(j)i (
′−1w(j)i ) .
• Calculate ψ˜(j) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 ψ
(j)
i .
This assumes that the voters use the same percep-
tual process to map party declarations from the five-
dimensional issue space to the two-dimensional “pre-
dictive” space as they use to map their own preferences
from the higher dimensional space to the lower dimen-
sional space.
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